A missed opportunity We suggest that, whatever judgments are made against DNA patents, the debate thus far has missed an opportunity to consider the wider issue of diagnostic patents and their role in innovation.
We draw on a seminar convened in London in 2010 by the Human Genetics Commission (HGC), at which this topic was explored by 31 participants from a wide range of stakeholder groups, including hospital staff, diagnostics and pharmaceutical firms, research funders, lawyers and ethicists 14 .
We begin by noting that the context of the debate differs between Europe and the United States. In molecular diagnostics, patent enforcement is more common in the United States than in Europe, and many European hospital laboratories have been able to largely ignore IP issues. Either laboratory directors have not been aware that the biomarkers they test for are patented, or they have willfully infringed patented tests by continuing to offer these services without obtaining the appropriate licenses. Either way, there seems to be little evidence that patenting activity has harmed European healthcare 15 . However, DNA patents are more firmly protected in Europe than in the United States, owing to specific provisions in national laws that ensure the patentability of DNA-based inventions 16 .
It will probably become increasingly difficult for laboratories to continue to ignore IP, because biomarker patenting is now part of the business strategies of molecular-diagnostics companies and is focused increasingly on applications of greater commercial value than rare-disease genetics, as we discuss below. Already, the pressures have prompted some countries to act: France, Belgium and Switzerland have created provisions for compulsory licensing of diagnostics in patent law 17 . Of course, these provisions may not be used, but discussions at the HGC workshop know-how while providing a temporary monopoly on commercial exploitation so that R&D investments can be recouped and inventors rewarded. Yet, in the case of diagnostics, patents have raised profound concerns because of suggestions that they push up the price of testing; that monopolies limit different approaches to testing, which could detract from the quality of tests available; and that innovation will be hindered as the proliferation of patents creates impenetrable 'thickets' 1,2 .
Those who see patent protection on diagnostics, such as genetic tests, as more harmful than beneficial have sought, variously, to challenge the very patentability of DNA, ensure exemption from liability for diagnostic patent infringement and even propose alternatives to patents in medical innovation more gener- Until recently, the debate has been synonymous with the DNA-patenting controversy, but we argue that the issues raised are of wider relevance as other types of biomarkers become the subject of diagnostic disputes. The recent US Supreme Court case of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., which overturned patent claims on thiopurine metabolite measurement (again after a series of prior verdicts), serves to emphasize this point 13 .The implications of this ruling for other cases remain to be seen, but prior analysis suggests that claims on diagnostic methods can be as hard, or even harder, to invent around than claims on the use of DNA sequences 8 .
W
ho should pay for the cost of developing a robust clinical evidence base to support the use of new diagnostic tests? This is a crucial question, and it must frame public policy and commercial strategy with respect to biomarker patents. For too long, the gene-patenting debate has been framed by an innovation model that assumes low regulatory barriers to market entry and an easy path to market and clinical adoption 1,2 . Those assumptions fly in the face of evidence of increasing regulatory hurdles and a slow, challenging process of technology diffusion 3 . Test developers are being asked to amass more evidence, more quickly, yet conventional business models for the in vitro diagnostics industry do not support large-scale trials of the utility of new biomarkers 4 .
Are biomarker patents part of the problem or part of the solution? Thus far, the debate has presented them as unwelcome disruptions to a status quo that supports open science within a public-service framework. Clinical scientists, often based in hospitals, are well known for producing innovative diagnostic services for their patients 5 . In recent years, however, many laboratories have found that they can no longer develop and offer services as they wish, owing to a proliferation of patents claiming biomarkers, such as DNA sequences or methods of testing, and threats of enforcement by those holding related intellectual property (IP) [6] [7] [8] .
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mercial reward in at least some cases.However, it is important to note that the company's R&D activities were also heavily dependent on public support-the pivotal trial that drove US adoption of the test was funded by the National Cancer Institute, for example 22 .
Paying for evidence and testing For biomarkers to be accepted by drug regulators and healthcare providers, extensive evidence is needed to show when biomarkers can delineate subpopulations of patients for whom drugs will work most effectively and safely 19 . In some cases, pharmaceutical companies have incentive to fund such R&D, such as when sales of their drug depend on test availability. For example, Roche, based in Basel, Switzerland, developed tests for the biomarker HER2 and subsidized testing services in the UK to facilitate the use of the monoclonal antibody Herceptin (trastuzumab) as a treatment for breast cancer 23 . IP can also serve further strategic roles-stakeholders such as diagnostics developers, pharmaceutical companies and regulators are growing increasingly keen to control who provides diagnostic tests in the future, because safe, speedy and effective prescription of drugs will depend on reliable diagnostics. However, if a test is not tied to the use of one company's drug, incentives for a given pharmaceutical company to fund diagnostic R&D are less obvious. The point is exemplified by the commercial failure of the Roche AmpliChip CYP450 Array, the first DNA microarray-based test to gain FDA approval for clinical use. The test distinguished 29 known polymorphisms in two genes involved in encoding the cytochrome P450 (CYP450) complex, whose role in the metabolism of many commonly used drugs is well established. The test is designed to inform optimal levels of drug dosing according to a patient's genetic profile. The clinical validity has been well documented, but the literature generally gives few clear guidelines on drug dosing. Although approved by FDA in 2005, the test has not been widely adopted and has been the subject of a series of negative HTAs by North American health payers, which state that the utility of testing CYP450-related genes remains unproven. The absence of such evidence is a result, in part, of Roche's lack of incentive to invest in the type of clinical studies that are being demanded. The company holds no patents or exclusive licenses on the genes encoding CYP450; therefore, any investment it makes in building the clinical evidence base would also benefit rival companies who have entered the CYP450 market or are preparing to do so. This is known as the free-rider problem 24 .
turn, ensure higher rates of reimbursement and provide incentives for greater investments in clinical trials to develop the evidence base for new biomarkers 4 . It remains unclear whether this strategy will be profitable, as healthcare providers place constraints on diagnostic prices and the value-based pricing that industry favors has not previously been a feature of diagnostics markets 19 .
Even if greater public sector funding was available to develop the evidence base for emerging biomarkers, the private sector would continue to seek rewards for making costly and risky R&D investments, with patents likely to remain a key incentive. Examples exist of cases in which companies have invested heavily in developing the clinical evidence base for diagnostics to exploit a strong IP position based on exclusive licenses to DNA patents. Diagnostics company Digene obtained a series of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approvals for its HPV tests. Between 1999, when the company obtained FDA approval for use of the Hybrid Capture 2 test for distinguishing between highand low-risk HPV, and 2003, when the test was approved as a primary HPV screening test for use alongside Pap testing, Digene spent around $40 million and supported trials involving tens of thousands of patients-at a time when this was almost the sole focus of the company's activities [20] [21] [22] .
Although Digene was involved in several litigations to maintain their position as sole provider of an FDA-approved HPV kit for a decade, the kit was made widely available to laboratories. The resulting franchise created considerable value, with Digene being acquired by Qiagen of Venlo, The Netherlands, for $1.6 billion in 2007 (ref. 22) . The Digene story suggests that biomarker patents can promote virtuous corporate behavior, encouraging far greater investment in translational research than is typical for diagnostics companies, and that this virtuous behavior will find its comhighlighted the potential role of biomarker IP in incentivizing investment in R&D to meet regulatory and health technology assessment (HTA) requirements for robust evidence of safety, efficacy and clinical utility.
Reframing diagnostic development
Some have suggested that patents are not necessary to stimulate development of diagnostics, for which, unlike therapeutics, R&D costs are low and development by hospital laboratories has been prolific even without the incentives provided by patents 7, 18 . After reviewing case studies on the development of ten classes of tests, the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) for the US Department of Health and Human Services also concluded that the exclusivity provided by patents or licenses had not been necessary to ensure that tests were developed and made available to patients 2 . However, the SACGHS research focused mainly on tests for the diagnosis of rare genetic disorders, neglecting those tests related to, for example, infectious agents or drug metabolism. Yet, as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics pointed out in its 2002 report 1 , although the validation of tests for single-gene diseases is relatively straightforward and inexpensive, that may not be the case for other types of tests.
The need to expand the evidence base beyond the relatively small field of clinical genetics is all the more pressing given the role that patents on viral DNA have had in innovations with major public-health impactsfor example, through tests for hepatitis C or human papillomavirus (HPV), which are used much more widely than most monogenic disease tests 14 . The approach the SACGHS took to framing the issues and evidence split their committee, with dissenters writing that the burden of regulatory compliance and the need for clinical utility were pushing up R&D costs for testing and that IP was required to incentivize companies to invest 2 .
Industry stakeholders at the HGC seminar similarly suggested that diagnostics companies face greater challenges as the evidence burden from HTAs increases. Previously, diagnostics developers relied on platform IP (i.e., on methods, instrumentation or reaction chemistries) when commercializing tests. Novel biomarkers have been developed with the accretion of knowledge from the not-forprofit and/or public sectors, often without IP on the analyte itself. In recent years, however, diagnostics developers have been keen to gain IP also on biomarkers, whether developed inhouse or licensed from researchers (often in universities or hospitals), in the hope that this will secure exclusivity in future markets and, in even if greater public sector funding was available to develop the evidence base for emerging biomarkers, the private sector would continue to seek rewards for making costly and risky R&D investments, with patents likely to remain a key incentive. pat e n t s npg Such debate requires a forum in which there is enough time to consider a broad range of diagnostic-development scenarios, a robust evidence base and a rigorous process of analysis to support policy recommendations.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding DNA patenting and its impacts on genetic testing has highlighted wider tensions over the privatization of pathology, revealing issues of relevance beyond the field of clinical genetics (where unease has been most loudly voiced to date). The proliferation of new diagnostics in applications with significant public-health impacts (such as screening and pharmacogenetics) requires that we consider the interconnections and trade-offs among different policy imperatives. Recently, dangers have been highlighted of problems that arise when new medical devices enter routine clinical practice without a robust evidence base to support their safety and effectiveness, leading to calls for more data, greater transparency and oversight in Europe 28 . Such evidence comes at a price. Stakeholders should, therefore, carefully consider the cost and complexity of diagnostic innovation, how the price of evidence can be paid for, and who will pay it. One thing seems clear: supporting innovation in the diagnostics sector while ensuring patient access to valuable new tests will require different strategies for different circumstances. This means that even previously controversial options, such as patented diagnostics and exclusive licenses that restrict market entrants, may have a part to play.
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